An Incentivized Approach for Fair Participation in Wireless Ad hoc
  Networks by Choudhuri, Arka Rai et al.
  

 
 
Arka Rai Choudhuri 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
National Institute of Technology, Karnataka (NITK) 
Surathkal, India 
ark.10co16@nitk.edu.in 
 
Shriyak Sridhar 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
National Institute of Technology, Karnataka (NITK) 
Surathkal, India 
shr.10co82@nitk.edu.in 
 
Kalyanasundaram S 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
National Institute of Technology, Karnataka (NITK) 
Surathkal, India 
kal.10co107@nitk.edu.in 
 
Annappa B 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
National Institute of Technology, Karnataka (NITK) 
Surathkal, India 
annappa@ieee.org 
 
 Abstract— In Wireless Ad hoc networks (WANETs), nodes 
separated by considerable distance communicate with each other 
by relaying their messages through other nodes. However, it 
might not be in the best interests of a node to forward the message 
of another node due to power constraints. In addition, all nodes 
being rational, some nodes may be selfish, i.e. they might not relay 
data from other nodes so as to increase their lifetime. In this 
paper, we present a fair and incentivized approach for 
participation in Ad hoc networks. Given the power required for 
each transmission, we are able to determine the power saving 
contributed by each intermediate hop. We propose the Fair and 
Incentivized Ad hoc Protocol (FASTER), which takes a selected 
route from a routing protocol as input, to calculate the worth of 
each node using the cooperative game theory concept of ‘Shapley 
Value’ applied on the power saved by each node. This value can 
be used for allocation of Virtual Currency to the nodes, which can 
be used for subsequent message transmissions. 
Keywords— Cooperative Game theory, Fair and Incentivized, 
Shapley Value, Virtual Currency 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Ad hoc Networks (WANETs) are the future of 
mobile communication. Being infrastructure-less networks, 
WANETs will be able to provide the flexibility and robustness 
required to completely support Ubiquitous Connectivity. 
 An Ad hoc network is one that consists of mobile nodes 
that communicate over a wireless medium. Due to limited 
radio transmission range, data is usually forwarded by multiple 
intermediate hops to the destination. This action also helps in 
conserving the energy of the sender node, and is vital for the 
functioning of an Ad hoc network. The major constraint in 
such networks is the battery life of the nodes in the system. 
Since each of the nodes is battery powered, they must conserve 
their available power so as to avoid premature discontinuation 
of their activities, as energy cannot be replenished in a short 
time. This limitation can lead to the „selfish‟ behavior of 
nodes, where a node refuses to forward the data of some other 
node in the network in order to conserve its own battery life. 
Initially, Ad hoc networks were used by armies near the 
battlefield to carry out swift communications without any 
preinstalled infrastructure. In this scenario, the nodes did not 
need any incentive to relay another node‟s request, as all nodes 
in the network had a common purpose. Modern day Ad hoc 
networks are mostly formed by nodes that do not collectively 
try to serve a predefined purpose; their aim is to send their 
messages while consuming as little energy as possible. Selfish 
nodes are common in Ad hoc networks as each node is 
autonomous and wants to maximize its yield from the network.  
In this paper, we argue that a node forwarding packets for 
some other node must gain some tangible benefit from the 
activity. This would act as an incentive to transmit the message 
to other nodes, thus helping the network thrive. 
This paper describes an incentivized game-theoretical 
approach to develop a fair algorithm when routing information 
from one node to another is given. The idea that nodes 
providing a service must be rewarded while those accepting a 
service must be charged has been explored before [1, 2, 3]. 
Based on this theme, many acceptance algorithms have been 
proposed. At each node, the decision of whether to forward or 
reject a relay request is taken by the acceptance algorithm. 
In this paper, we assume that network nodes have their own 
application needs and physical constraints, and thus have a 
choice of becoming selfish.  On this basis, we aim to study the 
impact of selfish users on the performance of the network. It 
must be noted that selfish users are different from malicious 
users, whose aim is to disrupt the functioning of the group, 
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even if the costs of achieving its goal are high. 
To provide a fair mechanism, where the remuneration that 
each node receives is proportional to its contribution and 
importance in the network, we propose the FAir Share 
incenTivizEd Ad hoc paRticipation protocol (FASTER) that 
uses the cooperative game theory concept of Shapley Value to 
allocate a payoff for each service provider. The payoff to each 
node is determined by the amount that each user contributes to 
the group. The contribution of each user is calculated by the 
amount of aggregate transmission power that the user saves by 
agreeing to relay the message. The power reduction can be 
used as an indicator of the value of a node in the network. 
Thus, if a node saves a greater amount of power by forwarding 
data, then it will earn a greater payoff. The concept of Shapley 
Value was used to calculate the payoff that each node which 
serves the network deserves. 
The payoff that each node earns will be in the form of 
some Virtual Currency [4]. This currency can be used as a 
payment for sending packets to other nodes on the network. A 
node that does not possess enough currency will be unable to 
send its own data over the network, and will thus have to be 
very cooperative in order to earn suitable wealth for 
transmission of its own information. 
The proposed protocol will not take care of the route 
selected, and will run over a suitable routing protocol such as 
AODV [5] which will use appropriate routing metrics [6] to 
calculate the best path for transmission. The protocol can be 
divided into 2 parts: Utility Measurement, which will measure 
the contribution of each node to the network and use the 
concept of Shapley Value to decide the payoff of each 
network, and Virtual Currency Allocation, which will allocate 
Virtual Currency tokens to each node that provides its 
services. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2, we review related work on the topic of cooperation 
in Ad hoc networks; Section 3 presents the design of 
FASTER; Section 4 describes the Simulation of FASTER and 
the results obtained; and Section 5 concludes the work done in 
the paper and points out areas for future research. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
CAP-SV [7] uses a similar mechanism of Shapley Value 
for rewarding nodes appropriately in a network, but also takes 
charge of finding efficient routes, and doesn‟t concern itself 
with currency allocation. CAP-SV proves to be an 
improvement on AODV in many cases. 
PARO [8] uses the fact that intermediate relays help 
greatly in conserving the energy of the sender. Any node 
running PARO must always keep its radios on, and this could 
lead to a very significant operation cost. To counter this, 
protocols such as SPAN [9] have been designed. [10] 
describes a protocol to ensure energy efficiency in a network 
with selfish users by introducing the „sympathy‟ parameter for 
forwarding traffic. 
Early research works in the field of WANETs took the 
cooperation between different nodes for granted
1
. This 
primitive model is not applicable today as most Ad hoc 
networks consist of autonomous independent users. Hence, 
methods have been proposed to encourage cooperation, which 
greatly improves the usage that each node can get out of the 
network. [11] also provides a mechanism whereby currency 
and services are shared by different hops till the message 
reaches the destination. 
Game Theory approaches for finding solutions to common 
issues in WANETs are becoming more popular today. It gives 
us an opportunity to treat the series of transactions between 
any two nodes as a game, and judging from the strategy of our 
opponent, allows us to make decisions. [12] proposes a game 
theory based protocol called GTFT that allows a node to stay 
in the network only if it cooperates. By this protocol, the 
throughputs of selfish users fall drastically.  
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
FASTER is designed to allow a fair approach to routing in 
Ad hoc networks. We assume that the received signal strength 
can be measured by each user, and that the link between any 2 
nodes is bidirectional. The FASTER header would require the 
addition of power and previous hop information so as to 
enable the necessary calculations and function correctly. We 
also assume that all nodes on the network are completely 
autonomous and can choose their next action. They can also 
decide to be non-truthful. Finally, we presume that all wireless 
communications that take place between the nodes follow the 
two-ray ground reflection model, which is an acceptable 
assumption in the given conditions [13].  
Every Ad hoc network can be modeled as a coalition of 
players, where each node in the system is a player. The aim of 
any coalition is to ensure that, as a group, the members receive 
more benefits than they would have if they had participated 
alone. Similarly, in Ad hoc networks, nodes will be able to 
transmit more messages if they cooperate with each other and 
forward messages. That being said, nodes would need 
remuneration for offering their services to the group. The 
payoff can be in the form of Virtual Currency, which nodes 
can use for transmitting their own messages. 
To ensure that the mechanism is fair, the compensation that 
each node receives must be proportional to its contribution to 
the network. To achieve this, we introduce the cooperative 
game theory concept of Shapley Value, which assigns a unique 
distribution of the total reward generated by a coalition of 
players. As some members contribute more than others, it is 
only fair that the payment they receive must be greater than 
that received by others. Thus, we can say that each node is 
rewarded in accordance with its importance in the 
arrangement. Shapley Value is also the only formula that 
satisfies the three axioms of cooperative games: efficiency, 
symmetry, and additivity. The Shapley Value function can be 
calculated as shown below: 
                                                                                            
                                                                                       
 
1 This is primarily because early WANETs were deployed in emergency 
situations such as war and flood, and all nodes had a common cause 
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In the equation, „n‟ is the total number of nodes in the 
coalition, and |S| is the current size of the coalition. „ʋ(S)‟ is 
the minimum reward that each member of the coalition can 
expect. Summation is taken over all considered members of 
the group and their worth is calculated. The total gain is 
distributed, and if two players are equivalent, i.e. ʋ(S U {i}) = 
ʋ(S U {j}), then their payoffs will be equal. 
A.  Power Saving Through Forwarding 
By the two-ray ground reflection model, the power 
required to transmit a message via many hops is less than that 
required while transmitting directly from source to destination. 
This is because the received power is inversely proportional to 
distance from the transmitter by the proportionality: 
 
                                                                                         (2) 
                              
 
As a result of this proportionality, we can see that a change 
in the distance will greatly affect the received power, all other 
factors such as antenna heights and gains remaining constant. 
This reduction in transmission power can have a profound 
effect on network performance by increasing the lifetime of the 
system. By FASTER design, the sender of any message will 
have an idea of the amount of energy saved by each of the 
nodes that offer their services. 
B.  FASTER Framework 
FASTER is a protocol that ensures fair participation in 
Wireless Ad hoc networks by using cooperative game theory 
approaches. FASTER does not take care of route discovery, 
evaluation and choosing, rather it works over a common 
routing protocol such as AODV which takes into account 
appropriate routing metrics for wireless situations before 
selecting a route. Given a predefined route selected by a 
routing protocol, FASTER will provide an incentivized 
mechanism where each participant feels adequately 
remunerated for the services offered. FASTER is composed of 
two stages: Partnership Formation (PF) and Virtual Currency 
Allocation (VCA). 
C. Partnership Formation 
The Partnership Formation phase of FASTER aims to 
model the nodes in the chosen route as a coalition of players 
who expect to be remunerated based on their contribution. The 
input to this phase is a predefined route selected by a routing 
protocol such as AODV or DSDV [14]. The advantage of this 
mechanism is that it is independent of the routing method 
used
2
. This phase considers all selected nodes as part of a 
coalition and offers each node a payoff depending on the 
power that it saves by forwarding the packet. It is assumed that 
all nodes are stationary. 
 
2 This is because FASTER Virtual Currency Allocation will function on 
top of any routing protocol in the protocol hierarchy. 
Consider a node Xs, which is the sender of a message and a 
node Xd, which is the designated destination. A relay node Xr 
will forward the packet only if the total power used in 
transmission using a relay is reduced. 
 
                                                                                               (3) 
 
Where Psr is the minimum power for packet transmission 
from Xs to Xr, Prd is the minimum power for packet 
transmission from Xr to Xd, the minimum power for packet 
transmission from Xs to Xd is Psd and ε is a positive constant, 
which ensures that power is always saved by the coalition. 
It is the responsibility of the sending node (Xs) to calculate 
the Shapley value of each intermediate node before the packet 
is actually sent. For this purpose, included with the predefined 
route that this phase receives, is the distance between adjacent 
intermediate nodes.  
As per the Shapley Value function, for each possible subset 
of the intermediate nodes (coalitions), we are required to 
calculate the coalition value. We use the total saved power in 
calculating the payoff value v(S) for each coalition S. 
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Where ds,r is the distance between the sender and the 
receiver and di,i+1 is the distance between adjacent hops in the 
path. 
Once this calculation is done by the sender, it obtains the 
contribution of each node by substituting the coalition values 
in the Shapley Value function. These contributions per node 
are weighted by a constant amount and sent along with the 
selected path.  
D. Virtual Currency Allocation 
FASTER uses Virtual Currency to incentivize the 
mechanism and encourage participation in the system. Nodes 
use this currency as payment to other nodes for relaying their 
messages, and earn the currency when they offer their services 
to other nodes. This property makes Virtual Currency a 
necessity in the network and thus each node will aim to 
increase the amount of currency it has. 
We assume that the user to whom the node belongs has 
complete control over the node, which means that a user can 
alter software, protocols and node equipment in order to 
achieve his goals. This results in „selfish‟ nodes, which require 
motivation to cooperate.  
The model that this paper proposes for charging nodes for 
packet forwarding service is similar to the Packet Purse Model 
(PPM) [15], where the sender is charged. The sender inserts 
into the packet the amount of currency that it must give to the 
nodes on the selected route for forwarding its message. In this 
model, the exact amount that is owed to each node is known by 
the Shapley Value calculation process. Due to this, each 
packet will contain the exact amount to be rewarded to all the 
nodes and will not suffer from the problem of overestimating 
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or underestimating the quantity to be paid. In addition, each 
packet will also contain an indication of the amount that each 
node has to receive. This ensures that each node gets what it 
deserves for helping the coalition. 
1. Virtual Currency Representation 
The proposed Virtual Currency system can be modeled in 
many ways. One such method is by using virtual coins, which 
are objects, each of which has a unique serial number that is 
immune to unauthorized modification. Serial numbers contain 
information that each node can act upon.  
 The first section of the serial number represents the issuer 
of the credit coin and the second section identifies the explicit 
contract that the coin represents. The contract is a binding 
promise of delivery of services or products, and will contain a 
timestamp of date of expiry. The third section recognizes the 
current owner. Nobody but the owner can spend a digital coin. 
As a result, the ownership section can be rewritten, and the 
coin need not be physically sent. The fourth section of the 
serial number defines the value of the coin.  
This method has a number of drawbacks. The overhead of 
simulating Virtual Currency through digital coins will be large 
and will significantly affect the performance of the network. In 
addition, this method would require established infrastructure 
in the form of an authority that issues coins to users, which is 
impractical in this case as Ad hoc networks should not depend 
on any existing infrastructure. 
 Citing these problems, we propose the use of a counter in 
each node to denote the amount of currency that it has. 
Counters do not suffer from the problems of transmission 
overhead and the need for existing infrastructure. However, to 
guarantee that nodes do not alter the contents of the counter 
and the correct counter value is maintained in each node, the 
counter must be maintained in a protected section, similar to 
that stated in [11], which does not allow access to the counter. 
2. Protection of Virtual Currency Integrity 
Protecting the integrity of Virtual Currency is a major issue 
when implementing the counter mechanism in each node. In 
order to avoid illegal modification of the counters, they must 
be kept out of the users‟ reach. The currency counter must be 
maintained in a protected section which is secured through 
trusted hardware, along with the private and public keys of the 
section, which should also be shielded  from alteration by the 
user. In addition, the protected section must also maintain a 
database of information of other nodes‟ protected section. This 
includes storing of a session key [16] for each node that a node 
communicates with. The session key is used in the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) cryptography mechanism to ensure that 
the packets containing Virtual Currency are not tampered with, 
and each node accepts only its share of currency. 
 The issue of each node taking only the amount of 
currency that is allotted to it by the Shapley Value calculation 
is also a very relevant one. To ensure that this is the case, we 
propose a design based on PKI. The FASTER VCA will 
include a header that is divided into sections, each of which 
will contain identifying information about a hop on a selected 
route and the amount of currency that is owed to it. Each 
section would be encrypted with the public key of the node 
that it represents. By PKI design, each node will be allowed 
access only to the section that it is concerned with. This is 
because the use of a node‟s private key on a packet to decrypt 
will only reveal information about currency allocation that is 
relevant to it. All other sections will still remain encrypted. 
IV. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION 
A.  Simulation Environment 
In order to observe the effects of the proposed system 
model on the performance of the network, we implemented 
FASTER in Python using the Networkx package. Our aim was 
to show that the Ad hoc network would be benefited when all 
nodes used FASTER. 
In the simulation, each node had a 250m communication 
range. FASTER was simulated in a 500m × 500m area. The 
simulation was conducted with 10, 15, and 20 nodes and each 
of them was randomly positioned on the grid. Nodes were 
assumed to be stationary. All nodes had an initial energy of 
100J. Transmission Power cost was 1.4W and receiving power 
cost was 1W. Idle Power cost was taken to be 0.83W. This 
energy model used was the same as that of CAP-SV.  Every 
node had a chance of sending a packet that was decided by a 
coin toss with a certain probability. If a node decided to send a 
packet across the network, then a suitable route through 
different hops was selected, and FASTER was used to find a 
fair currency allocation. 
B. Results 
Node richness is the amount of currency that a node has at 
a given point of time. In Figure 1, we can see that the 
discrepancy between different nodes in terms of richness is 
high. Since the amount of currency that a node gains is not 
proportional to its contribution in the network, some nodes 
may become very rich quickly due to a topographical 
advantage. Since power reduction is not considered, all nodes 
are paid equally, and these nodes become much richer than 
others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.Simulation Time vs. Richness without FASTER 
 
 In Figure 2, we can see that most nodes die out early 
when FASTER is not used, and this leads to low network 
 
  
performance, as most nodes with low remaining power will 
refuse to relay the messages of other nodes. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Simulation Time vs. Remaining Battery Life without FASTER 
 
 When using FASTER, there is a much greater equality 
among nodes with respect to battery life as well as richness. 
This is because nodes are given encouragement to participate 
in the forwarding of messages by allocating them some 
currency. It is evident from Figure 3 that the cooperative game 
theory aspect of FASTER introduces a greater equality among 
nodes in terms of the amount of currency that they possess. 
Nodes which save greater power and in turn use greater power 
in relaying will be rewarded more currency. Nodes which are 
rich will not have the power to continuously send messages as 
they have spent more battery in becoming rich. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Simulation Time vs. Richness with FASTER 
 
From Figure 4, it is apparent that network performance has 
significantly improved due to the use of FASTER.  Nodes last 
much longer in the network, and this supports the act of 
relaying information, which leads to improved network 
performance. With the inclusion of Shapley Value based 
calculation, nodes are given incentive to provide their services 
to the network. When all nodes exhibit this behavior, each 
node is able to last longer than it would have if it had been 
selfish.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Simulation Time vs. Remaining Battery Life with FASTER 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Lack of centralized control in Ad hoc networks implies that 
the behavior of the autonomous nodes that constitute the 
network has an enormous impact on network performance. The 
presence of self-governing nodes also implies that cooperation 
must be stimulated in the system in order to improve the 
service that each node receives. In this paper, we propose a 
protocol FASTER that provides a fair and incentivized 
mechanism to improve cooperation among nodes and hence 
improve network productivity.   
We present a scheme to determine the payoff that each 
node has to receive in a partnership using the cooperative 
game theory concept of Shapley Value. This ensures that each 
node is remunerated based on the services that it provides to 
the network. 
After the calculation of the Shapley Value, we also propose 
a method to distribute Virtual Currency effectively to the 
selected relay nodes in a secured manner so as to prevent any 
nodes from taking more currency than it deserves. 
Our scheme addresses the issue of how to determine the 
payoff for each node, as well as the issue of redeeming the 
earnings from the network. We prove by simulation that Ad 
hoc networks will benefit from the use of FASTER. 
Scalability of the protocol is an area for future work. This 
is due to the fact that the Shapley Value calculation involves 
computation based on the factorial of the selected number of 
hops.  In a large network, this could be a problem. 
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